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Can States “Just Say No” to Federal Health Care 
Reform? The Constitutional and Political Implications 
of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the federal government’s strong push toward 
national health care reform,1 as many as thirty-six state legislatures 
have taken steps to “Just Say No” to the federal health care overhaul 
package.2 For example, the Utah State Legislature passed a bill that 
prohibits Utah state agencies from “implement[ing] any part of 
federal health care reform” unless “the Legislature . . . pass[es] 
legislation specifically authorizing . . . the state’s compliance.”3 In 
Arizona, the November 2010 ballot included a proposed 
amendment to the state constitution that would render any potential 
national health insurance mandate inapplicable to Arizona citizens 
 
 1.  The federal health care reform bill, officially named the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, was signed into law by President Obama on March 24, 2010. Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs 
Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
 2.   Lisa Lambert et al., Factbox: States and Healthcare Reform, REUTERS, Mar. 22, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L2IN20100322; David A. 
Lieb, More States Fight Mandatory Health Insurance, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 2010, available 
at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/02/01/20100201health-states0201.htm 
l?source=nletter-news. Notably, federal health care reform is not the only federal program that 
has recently drawn the ire of state legislatures. States have also suggested or passed measures 
opposing federal gun laws, federal land policy, and federal implementation of the Clean Air 
Act. See, e.g., Robert Gehrke, Guv in a Box: Herbert Faces Test on States’ Rights, SALT          
LAKE TRIB., Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com     
/search?q=cache:frp9BkJwe4gJ:www.sltrib.com/rss/ci_14445225+%22guv+in+a+box%22+%2
2herbert+faces+test+on+states%27+rights%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Kirk Johnson,  
In the West, ‘Monument’ Is a Fighting Word, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A8; Brandon 
Loomis & Robert Gehrke, Gun Bill Signed by Herbert, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 26,            
2010, available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Kn_w7cwXGl4J: 
www.sltrib.com/utahpolitics/ci_14479562%3Fsource%3Drss+%22Gun+Bill+Signed+by+Herb
ert%22&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Ben Neary, Legislators Push for Increased State 
Sovereignty: Local Control, WYO. TRIB. EAGLE, Feb. 10, 2010, available at 
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/article_1bbcf164-f82c-59bc-
9652-68523c21a852.html. 
 3.   UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5(2)(a)-(b) (2010); see also Robert Gehrke, Panel 
OKs Bill Letting Utah Opt Out of Health Reform, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 2, 2010. 
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and employers.4 States pushing back against federal health care 
reform (whether by resolution, bill, or state constitutional 
amendment) are making two independent arguments against such 
reform. First, states assert that current federal health care proposals 
constitute an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereignty as 
protected under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.5 States 
argue that they retain power under the Tenth Amendment to 
regulate health care within their respective borders—a power that 
states contend was never ceded to the federal government. States are 
therefore vowing to legally challenge the constitutionality of federal 
health care reform as violative of the Tenth Amendment.6 
Second, in enacting measures to prohibit the implementation of 
federal health care reform within their borders, states are also 
asserting that they possess authority, independent of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, to invalidate federal health care reform as it would 
apply to each state’s respective citizens, employers, and agencies.7 
This effort by states to independently invalidate federal health care 
reform is referred to as the doctrine of nullification. Generally, the 
nullification doctrine—and its close cousin “interposition”—hold 
that states are independent interpreters of the federal Constitution 
and that states can therefore declare federal laws unconstitutional 
and inapplicable within their respective borders.8 It is important to 
 
 4.   Stephanie Simon, Another Health-Care Obstacle Awaits in States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
20, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870362660457 
5011131989913608.html. 
 5.   See John Hanna, Kansas House Approves Proposed Health Amendment, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Mar. 22, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9EJU1EGO.htm; David D. Kirkpatrick, Health Lobby Takes Fight to the States, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 2009, at A1; James Thalman, Utah Republicans Call Health Care Bill 
Unconstitutional, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/ 
article/705358053/Utah-Republicans-call-health-care-bill-unconstitutional.html?linkTrack= 
rss-30. 
 6.   See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5(1)(d)(i)-(ii) (2010) (asserting that 
federal health care proposals “infringe on state powers” and “impose a uniform solution to a 
problem that requires different responses in different states”). 
 7.   See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
 8.   BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1098, 837 (8th ed. 2004); Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky 
Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798 & Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 131–35 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Jefferson, 
Kentucky Resolutions]; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition 
Acts (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 589–91 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 
1999) [hereinafter Madison, Virginia Resolutions]. Nullification is the idea that states can 
declare federal laws unconstitutional, whereas interposition “is a more variable concept, 
sometimes synonymous with nullification, sometimes something less than nullification but 
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highlight that state nullification of federal law is completely 
independent from whether the federal judiciary (including the 
Supreme Court) considers the law constitutional.9 Under the theory 
of nullification, states themselves are independent interpreters and 
protectors of the federal Constitution and can therefore decide 
which federal laws are constitutional.10 
Current state opposition to national health care reform thus 
presents two important and independent legal questions: (1) 
whether federal health care reform is constitutional under current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence despite state claims that such reform 
violates the Tenth Amendment, and (2) whether states have 
authority to nullify or invalidate federal health care reform if they 
independently deem such legislation unconstitutional, regardless of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
The first question concerning the constitutionality of federal 
health care reform under current Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
recently been addressed by several constitutional and health care law 
scholars. Most of these scholars conclude that the Supreme Court’s 
broad interpretation of Congress’s power under both the Commerce 
Clause and the Taxing and Spending Clause, combined with the 
Court’s rather narrow view of the Tenth Amendment, suggest that 
federal health care reform is constitutional.11 However, some scholars 
assert that federal health care reform, especially the provision 
mandating that individuals purchase health insurance, is an 
 
more than mere protest.” CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 46 (2004). 
Interposition is not “categorical defiance by an individual state,” but interposition allows states 
to “seek support of other members of the compact [or other states].” Robert B. McKay, “With 
All Deliberate Speed”: A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1038 (1956). 
 9.   See DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 60–65 (2004). 
 10.   Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (8th ed. 2004); Jefferson, Kentucky 
Resolutions, supra note 8, at 131–35; Madison, Virginia Resolutions, supra note 8, at 589–91. 
 11.   See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 
37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 40–41 (2009); Simon Lazarus, Mandatory Health Insurance: Is It 
Constitutional?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, Dec. 2009, available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Lazarus%20Issue%20Brief%20Final.pdf; Corrine Propas Parver, 
National Health Care Reform: Has Its Time Finally Arrived?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 
207, 239–40 (2009); Jack M. Balkin, A Tax Like Any Other, ROOM FOR DEBATE http:// 
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-the-health-care-law-unconstitutional 
(Mar. 28, 2010, 19:00 EST); James F. Blumstein, A Permissible Exercise of Power, ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (Mar. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/03/28/is-the-health-care-law-unconstitutional. 
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unconstitutional exercise of congressional power.12 Since scholars on 
both sides of the debate have written extensively on the issue, this 
Comment will not further discuss the underlying constitutionality of 
federal health care reform. 
The second question, and the primary focus of this Comment, is 
whether the doctrine of nullification allows states to independently 
invalidate federal health care reform within their respective borders. 
The doctrine of nullification in the United States traces back to 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. In their famous Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions in response to the federal government’s passage 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts,13 both men argued that state 
legislatures could join together in challenging unconstitutional 
federal action.14 Using Jefferson’s and Madison’s arguments, states at 
various points throughout U.S. history have asserted their right to 
independently invalidate federal law within their borders. This 
Comment analyzes nullification’s checkered past and argues that the 
doctrine is void of constitutional support, is repeatedly rejected 
throughout U.S. history, and therefore cannot be used by states to 
invalidate federal law.  
However, despite being void of constitutional authority to nullify 
federal legislation, this Comment concludes that nullification can be 
employed by states as a powerful political tool in opposing federal 
legislation. As the majority of states move to nullify federal health 
care reform, state legislatures signal to the federal government that 
implementing such reform will be a difficult task as states will be 
sluggish to give effect to national health care reform within their 
 
 12.   See Peter Urbanowicz & Dennis G. Smith, Constitutional Implications of an 
“Individual Mandate” in Health Care Reform, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. AND PUB. POL’Y, 
July 10, 2009, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20090710_Individual_ 
Mandates.pdf; Randy Barnett, Exceeding Congress’s Authority, ROOM FOR DEBATE (Mar. 28, 
2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-the-health-care-
law-unconstitutional. Additionally, eighteen states have joined together in a lawsuit 
challenging the health care overhaul’s constitutionality. Pascal Fletcher, Florida Says Challenge 
to Healthcare Reform Widens, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSTRE6363NL20100407. 
 13.   Passed under the direction of President John Adams in 1798, and justified by the 
strong potential of war with France, the Alien and Sedition Acts “authorized the removal of 
dangerous aliens and effectively criminalized political dissent.” Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, 
Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
435, 438 (2007). 
 14.   Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 8, at 131–35; Madison, Virginia 
Resolutions, supra note 8, 589–91; see also Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the 
Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801, 873 (2008). 
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borders. Widespread state opposition to national health care reform 
also places intense political pressure in an election year on those 
congressional leaders who voted for such reform. Such pervasive 
state opposition at least suggests that congressional leaders passed 
health care reform in spite of general public disapproval of the bill. 
Finally, state opposition to federal health care reform maintains the 
issue’s political salience, potentially enabling conservatives to use the 
negativity surrounding health care reform to their benefit at the 
voting booth. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II addresses whether 
states can independently nullify or invalidate federal law. In this Part, 
the Comment discusses the underlying theory of the nullification 
doctrine and outlines the instances throughout U.S. history when 
states have attempted to use nullification to invalidate federal law. 
The Comment demonstrates how the doctrine of nullification has 
been repeatedly rejected as an unconstitutional exercise of state 
power and therefore concludes that states cannot nullify federal 
health care reform within their respective borders. However, Part III 
will discuss how nullification remains a powerful political tool that 
states can employ in opposing federal legislation, including the 
current federal health care overhaul. Part IV gives some concluding 
thoughts. 
II. STATE NULLIFICATION OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Whether states possess authority to nullify federal health care 
reform is a wholly independent inquiry from the likelihood that such 
reform is constitutional under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Nullification holds that states, regardless of Supreme Court 
precedent, can independently interpret the Constitution, declare 
federal laws unconstitutional, and invalidate such federal laws insofar 
as they would apply to each nullifying state.15 As discussed above, as 
many as thirty-six states have taken steps to oppose federal health 
care reform by resolution, bill, or state constitutional amendment.16 
These state legislative measures generally declare that federal health 
care reform unconstitutionally infringes upon state powers, and that 
states retain authority to nullify the federal health care overhaul 
 
 15.   See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 16.   See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
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package.17 In other words, many states are claiming the 
constitutional power to invalidate federal health care legislation 
within their respective borders. This Part first describes the origins of 
the nullification doctrine by outlining several instances in U.S. 
history when states have attempted to nullify federal law. This Part 
will then argue that because state nullification of federal law is 
repeatedly rejected throughout U.S. history as an unconstitutional 
exercise of state power, current attempts by states to nullify federal 
health care reform are equally invalid and will likewise be rejected. 
A. The Origins and Evolution of the Nullification Doctrine in the    
United States 
Supporters of the nullification doctrine repeatedly assert that 
state nullification of federal law traces its roots back to Founding 
Fathers James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—the authors of the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.18 This Section provides 
background to nullification by exploring the origins and evolution of 
the doctrine, including three separate nullification movements—the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in the late eighteenth century, 
John Calhoun’s more radical theory of nullification in the 1830s, 
and the post-Civil War nullification movement labeled “Massive 
Resistance” in response to Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil 
Rights Movement’s “Passive Resistance.” 
1. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
In the late 1700s, the fledgling United States was in deep 
turmoil. Federalist John Adams won the very partisan and 
contentious 1796 presidential election by three electoral votes over 
his political rival—Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson.19 
Following the election, the political climate was so volatile and 
divisive that both Federalists and Republicans feared the Union 
 
 17.   See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
 18.   See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2706, 2734–35 (2003); J. David Goodman, History, Nostalgia, and Nullification, CITY ROOM 
(Feb. 16, 2010, 11:12 AM), http://city room.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/history-
nostalgia-and-nullification. 
 19.   ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 1763–1876, at 181 
(James Albert Woodburn ed., 1905). At this point in U.S. history, the candidate receiving the 
second highest number of votes (the runner-up) became Vice-President—making Thomas 
Jefferson Vice-President. Id. 
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could disintegrate.20 Accompanying this tempestuous political 
climate was a widespread fear of an American war with France.21 The 
Federalist-controlled Congress worried (probably unjustifiably) that 
Democratic-Republicans would somehow take advantage of this 
potential war with France to seize control of the federal 
government.22 Seeking to consolidate their power, Federalists passed 
the Alien and Sedition Acts in the summer of 1798.23 The Alien Acts 
authorized the President, without a showing of guilt, to deport 
foreigners whose activities he considered dangerous.24 The Sedition 
Act generally forbade citizens from opposing any measure of the 
Federalist-controlled government and “made it illegal to speak, 
write, or print any statement that would bring the president into 
‘contempt or disrepute.’”25 
 
 20.   GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22 (2004) (explaining that Federalist 
leaders “feared the breakup of the union” and even “predicted a civil war” while Democratic-
Republican Senator John Taylor warned that “secession must be considered an option”). 
 21.   Id. at 22–25. Great Britain declared war against France following the French 
Revolution in 1789, fearing that revolution could spread throughout Europe. Id. at 21. 
Federalists supported the British cause whereas Democratic-Republicans, most notably Thomas 
Jefferson, “insisted that war with France would be calamitous” by “[driving] the United States 
into the arms of England.” Id. at 23. 
 22.   Id. at 28. Federalists even accused the Democratic-Republican opposition of 
conspiring with the French. Id. at 28–29. Some scholars argue that decrying the threat of a 
French-American war was a pretext for Federalists to build a stronger military force in case of 
civil war. PAUL S. BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE 160 (6th ed. 2008). 
 23.   JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 182; see also STONE, supra note 20, at 29 (explaining 
that in passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, Federalists attempted to strike a critical blow 
against the Democratic-Republicans). President Adams was actually apprehensive about these 
Acts but went along with his Federalist cohorts in Congress. See Melissa M. Tomkiel, Note, 
Enemy Combatants and Due Process: The Judiciary’s Role in Curbing Executive Power, 21 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 411, 419–20 (2006). Ironically, the Alien and Sedition Acts 
eventually “resulted directly in displacing the Federalists from power and bringing the 
Jeffersonian Republicans into the control of the Government.” JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 
182; see also Part III.A. 
 24.   BOYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 160. There were three Alien Acts: (1) the Alien 
Enemies Act (which outlined procedures for determining whether a hostile country’s citizens 
threatened the United States), (2) the Alien Friends Act (which authorized the President to 
deport foreign persons whose activities President Adams considered dangerous), and (3) the 
Naturalization Act (which increased the residency requirement for United States citizenship 
from five to fourteen years). Id. at 160–61. 
 25.   Id. at 161 (quoting 1 Stat. 596 § 2 (1798) (expired 1801)). The Sedition Act also 
made it a federal crime to “‘write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and 
malicious’ words about Congress.” Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of 
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Following the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Democratic-Republican politicians and citizens throughout the 
country continued to criticize both the Acts and the Federalist 
government despite the threat of prosecution for federal crimes.26 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions became the leading battle 
cry of Democratic-Republicans who viewed many acts of the 
Federalist leadership in Washington as unconstitutional. “These 
resolutions reflected the Republicans’ grim conclusion that to save 
republicanism from the Federalist onslaught, they had to strengthen 
the states as ‘bastions of safety’ from repressive federal legislation.”27 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (written anonymously28 
by Madison and Jefferson, respectively) asserted the “compact 
theory” of the Constitution: that sovereign states were the creators 
of the federal government, and as such, the states gave the federal 
government only those limited powers enumerated in the 
Constitution or “the compact.”29 According to both Madison and 
Jefferson, all powers not enumerated in the federal Constitution 
were retained by the states and protected under the Tenth 
Amendment.30 Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions asserted that if the 
federal government exceeds its limited powers, such federal action is 
“unauthoritative, void and of no force.”31 The Kentucky Resolutions 
also urged that state “nullification . . . is the rightful remedy” when 
the federal government violates its constitutional compact with the 
states.32 The Resolutions endorsed a collective, cooperative 
 
Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1692 (2008) (quoting 1 Stat. 596 § 2 (1798) 
(expired 1801)). 
 26.   See STONE, supra note 20, at 44.  
 27.   Id. Notably, Jefferson did not reveal his authorship of the Resolutions until years 
later, in December of 1821. JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 188. 
 28.   The Resolutions were written anonymously for obvious reasons: Jefferson was 
serving as Vice-President under President and Federalist John Adams, and neither Jefferson nor 
Madison wanted to publicly oppose the Federalists and risk prosecution under the Sedition 
Act. See STEPHANIE P. NEWBOLD, ALL BUT FORGOTTEN: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 6 (2010). 
 29.   Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance—The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M. L. 
REV. 167, 192 (1997) (citing JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1789–1801, at 239–
40 (1960)). 
 30.   See DONALD F. KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 37 (2002) (summarizing both 
Jefferson’s and Madison’s views of the Tenth Amendment). 
 31.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 47 (quoting Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 
8, at 131) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32.   JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 191–92. 
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opposition process where states, as independent interpreters and 
protectors of the Constitution, could band together to invalidate 
federal law.33 For this reason, the Kentucky Resolutions pleaded with 
other states to “concur in declaring these [acts] void and of no 
force” and requested “their repeal at the next session of Congress.”34 
Madison’s Virginia Resolutions were more tempered than the 
Kentucky Resolutions, but nonetheless argued that “states . . . have 
the right, and are . . . duty bound, to interpose”35 when the federal 
government exceeds its limited constitutional powers. Although 
Madison’s original draft of the Virginia Resolutions called upon 
other states to “cooperate in the annulment” of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, “Madison was more cautious than Jefferson about 
giving state legislatures any power to block federal legislation.”36 For 
this reason, the Virginia Resolutions did not use the word 
“nullification” or endorse the theory that states could individually 
declare federal laws void.37 It is worth reiterating that neither 
Jefferson nor Madison endorsed the theory that a state could 
independently nullify federal law.38 Both men believed, to varying 
degrees, that states could band together to interpret the 
constitutionality of federal laws and, as a group, lawfully oppose 
federal legislation. However, neither advanced the idea that states 
 
 33.  JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER, FOUNDER, AND STATESMAN 273 (John R. Vile et 
al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Vile]. 
 34.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Jefferson, Kentucky 
Resolutions, supra note 8, at 134). 
 35.   Id. at 48. The doctrine of interposition (alluded to in Madison’s Virginia 
Resolution) is usually thought of as being different from nullification. Nullification is the idea 
that states can declare federal laws unconstitutional, whereas interposition “is a more variable 
concept, sometimes synonymous with nullification, sometimes something less than nullification 
but more than mere protest.” Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius’s Vision, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 745, 747 n.14 (2008) (quoting DRAHOZAL, supra note 8) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Interposition is not “categorical defiance by an individual state,” but 
interposition allows states to “seek support of other members of the compact.” Id. (quoting 
McKay, supra note 8). “Failing in such support, the interposing state . . . would seem 
obligated to accede to the unwelcome act . . . .” Id. (quoting McKay, supra note 8).  
 36. FARBER, supra note 9, at 47. 
 37.   See JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 196. Madison saw a difference between 
invalidating or voiding federal law and opposing federal law. FARBER, supra note 9, at 67–69. 
Opposition, according to Madison, involved organizing a convention of states to interpret the 
Constitution and assert the unconstitutionality of federal laws. Id. This assertion of 
unconstitutionality did not translate to nullification for Madison. Id. 
 38.   See JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 197–98. 
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could independently or individually invalidate federal law.39 As 
discussed below,40 Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican cohorts 
took advantage of this strong popular resentment against the Alien 
and Sedition Acts to seize the Presidency and control of Congress in 
the election of 1800. Nullification movements throughout U.S. 
history, including the current movement against federal health care 
reform, base their nullification arguments on the Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions.41 
2. John Calhoun and the Nullification Crisis of 1832 
Thirty years after Jefferson’s and Madison’s stand against the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, John Calhoun used the Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions as ammunition in his own fight against the 
federal government. In 1832, the state of South Carolina and Vice-
President John Calhoun made a serious attempt to revive the 
nullification doctrine during the Nullification Crisis of 1832–33. 
The Tariff of 1828, labeled by Southerners as the “Tariff of 
Abominations,”42 triggered the crisis. The tariff had a 
disproportionate impact on the price of manufactured goods coming 
from the South—thereby “penalizing southern exports and the 
southern economy”43 while protecting western agriculture and New 
England manufacturing.44 In 1832, when pleas for tariff reform fell 
on deaf ears (likely because of the high revenue such tariffs generated 
for the federal government), South Carolina, led by Vice-President 
John Calhoun (a South Carolina native), passed an ordinance 
 
 39.   Id. John Calhoun, on the other hand, greatly expanded the opposition doctrines of 
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions by allowing independent state nullification of federal 
law. See infra text accompanying notes 42–50. This expansion of the ideas found in the 
Resolutions enraged Madison. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 40.   See infra Part III.A. 
 41.   See infra Parts II.A.2 & 3; Hagley, supra note 29, at 192 (explaining that the 
nullification resolutions passed by southern states in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education “borrowed greatly from the original Virginia Resolution of 
1798”); Goodman, supra note 18 (briefly describing the underlying theories of the current 
nullification movement against the cap and trade movement—including a discussion 
concerning the compact theory of the Constitution). 
 42.   WILLIAM M. DAVIDSON, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 297 (1902). 
 43.   Ben Baack et al., Constitutional Agreement During the Drafting of the Constitution: 
A New Interpretation, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 551 (2009). 
 44.   BOYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 219. 
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declaring the tariffs unconstitutional.45 The nullification ordinance 
declared that the tariffs on southern exports were “utterly null and 
void” as they applied to South Carolina, “and directed the legislature 
to pass statutes preventing the implementation” of such tariffs in the 
state.46 The ordinance gravely warned that if the federal government 
attempted to forcibly enforce the tariffs on southern exports, South 
Carolina would secede from the Union.47 With this ordinance, South 
Carolina and Calhoun took the compact principles established in the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and greatly expanded them.  
While the more moderate Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
claimed that states could band together and “concurrently and co-
operatively”48 oppose unconstitutional federal action, South 
Carolina’s nullification ordinance asserted that each state could 
individually and independently nullify federal law.49 Calhoun asserted 
that single-state nullification would suspend the operation of the 
nullified federal law as it applied to all other states until a convention 
could be called to allow the other states to either accept or reject the 
nullification ordinance.50 According to Calhoun, if the convention of 
states rejected the single state’s nullification ordinance, the nullifying 
state would either be required to rescind the nullification ordinance 
 
 45.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 60. Previously a nationalist, John Calhoun switched course 
and wholeheartedly endorsed the nullification doctrine—publicly speaking in support of 
nullification in 1831. Id.; see also WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE 
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at 154 (1992) (stating 
that Calhoun had privately espoused the nullification doctrine as early as 1827, midway 
through his first term as Vice President). “South Carolina’s Ordinance of Nullification was a 
concrete implementation of Calhoun’s theory.” FARBER, supra note 9, at 60. 
 46.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 60. South Carolina clearly covered its bases with its 
nullification ordinance—the ordinance required military, civil officers, and jurists to take an 
oath supporting nullification. Id. The ordinance also attempted to preclude appeals to the U.S. 
Supreme Court concerning its legality. Id. at 60–61. 
 47.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 61. 
 48.   Vile, supra note 33, at 273. 
 49.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 65 (“As parties to the constitutional compact, they 
[(states)] retain the right . . . of interposing for the purpose of arresting, within their respective 
limits, an act of the federal government in violation of the constitution; and thereby of 
preventing the delegated from encroaching on the reserved powers.”) (quotation omitted). 
James Madison ardently and publicly opposed Calhoun’s theory of nullification. See infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 50.   Vile, supra note 33, at 270. James Read describes the consequences of Calhoun’s 
nullification theory very well, “Thus . . . any questionable act of [federal] legislation, would 
have to not only achieve a majority in both houses of U.S. Congress but also be supported, or 
at least not actively opposed, by a majority within any individual state. In what was in effect a 
reversal of the constitutional amending process.” Id. 
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or constitutionally secede from the Union—an attempt by Calhoun 
to legitimize South Carolina’s threats of secession.51 By nullifying the 
federal tariff statutes and by threatening dire consequences if the 
federal government responded unfavorably, South Carolina’s 
nullification ordinance triggered a national crisis. 
President Andrew Jackson, furious with the actions of South 
Carolina and his Vice-President Calhoun, issued a presidential 
proclamation declaring nullification and secession illegal and vowing 
to use his Article II powers to forcibly compel compliance with the 
tariffs if necessary.52 After a long process of negotiation, South 
Carolina rescinded its nullification of the tariffs, President Jackson no 
longer felt compelled to intervene with military force, and South 
Carolina accepted the federal government’s compromise tariff.53  
3. “Massive Resistance” by southern legislatures against the Brown 
decision 
Although the country avoided South Carolina’s secession (at 
least for a few years), Calhoun’s expansion of the nullification 
doctrine had a lasting impact. In the 1950s, for example, southern 
state legislatures relied on Calhoun’s more radical theory of 
nullification in opposing desegregation rather than the more 
moderate opposition theories found in the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions.54  
 
 51.   Id. There is absolutely no mention of secession in the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, nor is there any implication in these Resolutions that secession would be available 
to a state opposing federal law. Id. at 274–75. 
 52.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 61–62. Jackson’s statement, known as the Nullification 
Proclamation, was a “cogently argued statement” that not only focused on the actions of 
South Carolina, but attacked the general theory of nullification “as a doctrine ‘incompatible 
with the existence of the Union.’” RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN 
DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 179 (1989). Readers of 
Jackson’s opposition to nullification at first doubted its authenticity because of Jackson’s 
previous defense of state rights. Id. Despite President Jackson’s well-reasoned constitutional 
argument against nullification in his public statements, Jackson reportedly told Martin Van 
Buren that Calhoun should be hanged as a traitor to his country. FARBER, supra note 9, at 61. 
 53.   BOYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 220–21; see also FARBER, supra note 9, at 62. The 
Compromise of 1833 between Calhoun and Jackson was spearheaded by Senator Henry 
Clay—the South begrudgingly accepted a less burdensome tariff bill and President Jackson 
begrudgingly accepted the Senate’s refusal to allow him to collect the 1828 and 1832 tariffs by 
force. See ELLIS, supra note 52, at 170–77. 
 54.   Modern-day nullification supporters also point to Calhoun’s nullification theories 
for support. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/1/2011  7:16 PM 
1795 Can States “Just Say No” to Federal Health Care Reform? 
 1807 
Following the Supreme Court’s 1954 desegregation decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education,55 southern states mounted what 
became known as Massive Resistance to the federal government’s 
desegregation policies.56 As part of this resistance against the Brown 
decision, southern legislatures revived Calhoun’s ideas of 
nullification and interposition, reasserted the compact theory of the 
Constitution, and declared that Brown was an unconstitutional 
federal usurpation of state sovereign prerogatives and power.57 The 
resolutions passed by southern legislatures borrowed directly from 
Calhoun’s opposition to the 1828 tariff statutes, declaring the Brown 
decision “null, void and of no effect” (Alabama) and resolving to 
“take all appropriate measures . . . to resist this illegal encroachment 
upon our sovereign powers” (Virginia).58 Mississippi’s resolution 
labeled Brown “unconstitutional, invalid and of no lawful effect 
within . . . Mississippi.”59 Unlike Calhoun and South Carolina, 
southern legislatures opposed to Brown did not threaten secession, 
but they did claim authority to invalidate Brown pending a 
constitutional amendment.60 Southern states saw Brown not as an 
interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, but as an 
unlawful amendment to the Constitution.61 These states asserted 
their right and duty, referring to Madison’s language in the Virginia 
Resolutions, to resist the Supreme Court’s “illegal” constitutional 
 
 55.   347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 56.   See DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SOLID SOUTH: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 136–38 (1992). The term “Massive Resistance” describes southern 
legislatures’ opposition to the desegregation movement while “passive resistance” describes the 
actions by those fighting against southern states and in support of the Brown decision. See 
GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 109 (2007). 
 57.   See GRANTHAM, supra note 56, at 139. Southerners saw the nullification and 
interposition doctrines as a panacea that could “turn back federal intervention in the South’s 
traditional pattern of race relations and a solution to the region’s problem resulting from 
Brown v. Board of Education.” Id. 
 58.   RACE, REASON, AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE: THE DIARY OF DAVID J. MAYS, 1954–
1959, at 96 (James R. Sweeney ed., 2008) [hereinafter Sweeney]. 
 59.   William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why 
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 493 (2002) (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 
3767 (1956)). In all, six southern states passed resolutions asserting the unconstitutionality of 
the Brown decision. Id. at 493–94. 
 60.   See Hagley, supra note 29, at 193; see also Sweeney, supra note 58, at 95–96. 
 61.   Hagley, supra note 29, at 193. 
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amendment until a valid, lawful amendment could be passed under 
Article V of the Constitution.62  
As will be discussed in detail below, the South’s attempts to 
nullify Brown were eventually rejected,63 the push to amend the 
Constitution in opposition to Brown failed, and southern states 
opposed to desegregation were eventually compelled by force to 
comply with the provisions of Brown and its progeny.64 However, 
the Massive Resistance movement against the Brown decision 
demonstrated that Calhoun’s ideas concerning state nullification and 
interposition still garnered a relatively large degree of support—thus 
surviving the Civil War and the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The preceding discussion concerning the origins and evolution 
of nullification demonstrates that the doctrine has a long and 
checkered past. What directly follows is a discussion of whether the 
nullification doctrine ever had, or currently has, any degree of 
constitutional legitimacy in the U.S. constitutional scheme. 
B. The Doctrine of Nullification Is an Unconstitutional Exercise of 
State Power and Is Repeatedly Rejected Throughout U.S. History 
As explained above, states throughout U.S. history have 
attempted to use variations of the nullification doctrine to invalidate 
federal law. However, every attempt by states to nullify federal law 
was clearly rejected by not only the federal government, but also by 
other states. This Section describes how the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions, John Calhoun’s nullification movement, and the 
South’s Massive Resistance movement were each resoundingly 
rejected. This unanimous historical rejection of nullification 
demonstrates the doctrine’s unconstitutionality and undermines the 
legality of the current movement to nullify federal health care 
reform. 
 
 62.   Id. 
 63.   See infra Part II.B.3. The most explicit rejection of the South’s attempt to nullify 
Brown is found in the Supreme Court opinion of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) 
(quoting U.S. v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809)), which stated that the nullification doctrine 
would render the Constitution “a solemn mockery.” The Cooper case and several other cases 
rejecting the nullification doctrine are discussed in detail below. See infra Part II.B.3. 
64.  Hagley, supra note 29, at 210–11. 
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1. The rejection of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
Despite a valiant attempt by Jefferson and Madison to gain 
widespread support in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts, the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and the principles therein, were 
resoundingly rejected by a majority of other states.65 The Resolutions 
pleaded with other states to join Kentucky and Virginia in declaring 
the Alien and Sedition Acts “void, and of no force.”66 However, no 
other state joined the opposition, and ten states actually repudiated 
the Resolutions.67 The Maryland Legislature, for example, called the 
resolutions “highly improper” and stated that “‘no State government 
. . . is competent to declare an act of the Federal Government 
unconstitutional.’”68 In a long and detailed response, the 
Massachusetts Legislature also repudiated any notion that state 
legislatures were competent to determine the constitutionality of 
federal laws.69 Moreover, Vermont’s legislature turned the tables on 
Virginia and Kentucky by accusing both states of encroaching upon 
powers “‘exclusively vested in the judiciary courts of the Union.’”70 
Modern proponents of the nullification doctrine repeatedly argue 
that if two great Founders such as Jefferson and Madison espoused 
the view that states could join together and invalidate federal law, 
the doctrine of nullification should not be dismissed as a mere 
rejected theory of the past.71 These nullification proponents seem to 
 
 65.   WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR LEGACY 75 (2004). 
 66.   STONE, supra note 20, at 45. 
 67.   Id. at 45. According to William Watkins, “Nine states north of the Potomac put 
their objurgations in writing . . . . The Southern states did not respond at all.” WATKINS, supra 
note 65, at 75. 
 68.   STONE, supra note 20, at 45 (alteration in original). 
 69.   See JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 189. Then U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, 
Theodore Sedgwick, called the Resolutions “little short of a declaration of war.” STONE, supra 
note 20, at 45. 
 70.   STONE, supra note 20, at 45. 
 71.   See, e.g., Bradley D. Hays, A Place for Interposition? What John Taylor of Caroline 
and the Embargo Crisis Have to Offer Regarding Resistance to the Bush Constitution, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 200, 202 (2007) (citing the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions as examples where “State 
governments . . . exposited constitutional norms in an effort to define the new constitutional 
order,” but failing to mention that this “effort” by Kentucky and Virginia garnered absolutely 
no support from other states); Paulsen, supra note 18, at 2734–35 (arguing that the 
nullification and interposition doctrines should not be regarded as “constitutional profanities” 
because of the doctrine’s “respectable roots” in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions); Note, supra note 35, at 746–49, 748 n.20, 749 n.25 (using Madison to 
support arguments favoring a “horizontal” structure of federalism where states would be 
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ignore the fact that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the 
principles found therein, did not receive support from even one 
other state in the Union. Many leaders of the states that declined to 
join in opposing the federal government were also Founders.72 Yet 
the great majority of state leaders openly repudiated the ideas found 
in the Resolutions. This open rejection of the compact theory of the 
Constitution and the doctrine of nullification by Madison’s and 
Jefferson’s contemporaries greatly weakens—if not completely 
invalidates—current arguments for extending the doctrine. However, 
to more fully demonstrate that the doctrine of nullification is truly 
dead, the following Sections describe two subsequent instances 
where the doctrine of nullification was rejected. 
2. The rejection of John Calhoun’s nullification theories 
Proponents of the nullification doctrine also point to John 
Calhoun’s theories in order to support the doctrine’s continued 
validity.73 However, what these proponents fail to acknowledge is 
that even James Madison—“the father of the Constitution”74—was 
appalled by Calhoun’s nullification movement.75 “Madison was 
particularly upset with what he regarded as an effort to pervert the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions into a pretext for disunion.”76 
Through several well-publicized letters, Madison intensely criticized 
 
“guard dogs” of the Constitution rather than the current vertical form of federalism). Michael 
Paulsen also uses Jefferson’s and Madison’s views to assert the likelihood that the Founders 
espoused “[a] multiplicity of voices” in interpreting the Constitution. Paulsen, supra note 18, 
at 2736–38. 
 72.   In 1798, a number of signatories to the Constitution were state and national 
leaders: William Samuel Johnson in Connecticut; Richard Bassett and Gunning Bedford in 
Delaware; Nicholas Gilman and John Langdon in New Hampshire; Jonathan Dayton in New 
Jersey; Jared Ingersoll and Thomas Mifflin in Pennsylvania; and Pierce Butler, Richard Dobbs 
Spaight, and Charles Pinckney in South Carolina. See R. B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS RECONSIDERED (2009); MELVIN E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES 
OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 144–71 (2d ed. 1994). 
 73.   See Pat Buchanan, Secession Is in the Air, JACKSONVILLE OBSERVER, Feb. 15, 2010, 
http://www.jaxobserver.com/2010/02/15/secession-is-in-the-air/ (last visited Jan. 25, 
2011); Patrick Krey, State vs. Federal: The Nullification Movement, NEW AM., Feb. 18, 2010, 
http://thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/constitution/2957-state-vs-federal-the-
nullification-movement (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
 74.   GARRY WILLIS, JAMES MADISON 37 (2002). 
 75.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 66. 
 76.   Id. Farber explains that during the final six years of Madison’s life, he “could not get 
the nullifiers out of his mind,” being so anxious about the Nullification Crisis that the subject 
sometimes led to “physical collapse.” Id. at 66–67. 
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and rejected Calhoun’s theory of nullification.77 In these letters, 
Madison reasserted the compact theory of the Constitution, but he 
rejected any notion that individual states could independently nullify 
federal law or interpret the Constitution—saying that this practice 
would “‘altogether distract the Govt. of the Union & speedily put an 
end to the Union itself.’”78 Madison criticized Calhoun’s theory of 
nullification as upsetting the balance between the states themselves. 
Specifically, Madison argued that the fundamental problem with 
Calhoun’s nullification theory is that it “would allow a single state to 
immunize itself from constitutional restrictions, thereby making at 
least a temporary de facto amendment to the Constitution without 
the consent of any other state, far less the three-fourths required by 
the amendment procedure.”79 This, according to Madison, would 
improperly result in the minority imposing its will on the majority.80 
To add insult to the injuries caused by Madison’s rejection of the 
nullification doctrine, South Carolina and Calhoun could not muster 
support from even one other southern state.81 The Georgia 
Legislature, for example, responded to South Carolina’s call for 
widespread nullification by directly citing Madison: “[I]t is not 
believed among us that a State can annul an act of Congress within 
her boundary and remain in the confederacy . . . . Mr. Madison’s 
recent exposition of [the Virginia Resolutions of 1798] is highly 
approved here.”82 By the end of Calhoun’s Nullification Crisis, most 
 
 77.   Id. at 67; Vile, supra note 33, at 270–71. 
 78.   FARBER, supra note 9, at 67. Madison reasoned that uniformity of laws is “itself a 
vital principle,” and that if both state and federal interpretations of federal laws were upheld, 
federal and state officers “would have rencounters in executing conflicting decrees, the result 
of which would depend on the comparative force of the local posse.” Id. (quotation marks 
omitted). If and when compromise broke down, union would be threatened. Id.   
 79.   Id. at 68. Madison stated that Calhoun’s doctrine “puts it in the power of the 
smallest fraction over ¼ of the U.S. . . . to give the law and even the Const[itution] to 17 
States.” Vile, supra note 33, at 274 (quoting JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 848 (Jack N. 
Raklove ed., 1999). 
 80.   See Vile, supra note 33, at 281. Madison believed Calhoun’s theories hearkened 
back to the rejected Articles of Confederation “under which a single state could block any 
significant nationwide action.” Id. at 271. James H. Read also asserts that the southern states’ 
continuous attempt “to have their way on every federal question” was the impetus behind the 
Civil War. Id. at 281. “Madison had intended in the Virginia Resolutions not to thwart 
permanently the will of a national majority but to build a national majority to overturn the 
obnoxious laws in some constitutional manner.” Id. at 273. 
 81.   Vile, supra note 33, at 272. 
 82.   Id. (quoting Charles J. McDonald to Calhoun (May 30, 1831) in THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN C. CALHOUN, 11:396–97 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1959–2001)). This isolation of South 
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other southern states “were sick to death of South Carolina.”83 In 
short, Calhoun’s nullification theories fell flat, even among his peers 
in the South. 
Just as Jefferson’s and Madison’s contemporaries rejected the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, Calhoun’s contemporaries 
rejected his nullification theories. Madison’s pointed criticisms of 
Calhoun’s ideas also seemed to drive the final nails into the 
nullification doctrine’s coffin. However, as discussed above, southern 
states resurrected the doctrine by opposing the federal implications 
of the Brown decision. Segregationist states fought hard to establish 
nullification’s validity, but the doctrine was once again completely 
rejected for not being a viable constitutional principle. 
3. The rejection of the nullification doctrine during the Civil Rights 
Movement 
Massive Resistance by southern state legislatures in opposition to 
Brown v. Board of Education involved a more widespread attempt to 
nullify federal law than previous nullification movements. Virginia 
and Kentucky were alone in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts; 
South Carolina could not garner any support during the 
Nullification Crisis of 1832; but Massive Resistance in the 1950s 
involved resolutions passed by eight southern states attempting to 
nullify the Brown decision.84 Despite this more widespread attempt 
to nullify federal law, Massive Resistance, including the movement’s 
underlying nullification principles, was categorically rejected. This 
rejection of nullification is especially illuminating because of the 
judiciary’s role in dismissing the South’s nullification arguments. 
Although many southern legislators viewed nullification and 
interposition as solutions to the “problems” created by the Brown 
decision, leaders of the legal community throughout the country 
(including the South) knew that the nullification doctrine had no 
legal or constitutional foundation.85 Future Supreme Court Justice 
 
Carolina by the entire block of southern states was a problem that South Carolina worked hard 
to resolve in the years leading up to the Civil War. See FREEHLING, supra note 45, at 323–24. 
 83.   FREEHLING, supra note 45, at 326. 
 84.   See infra notes 85–100 and accompanying text. 
 85.   See Hagley, supra note 29, at 193 n.184 (quoting MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 240–41 
(1994)); Ross, supra note 59, at 495–96 (quoting Recent Attacks Upon the Supreme Court: A 
Statement by Members of the Bar, 42 A.B.A. J. 1128, 1128–29 (1956)). 
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Lewis Powell (then acting superintendent of Richmond, Virginia’s 
public schools) wrote that nullification and interposition were “legal 
nonsense that no court would ever adopt.”86 A group of over one-
hundred “politically and geographically diverse” attorneys attacked 
the South’s nullification resolutions as “reckless in their abuse[,] . . . 
heedless of the value of judicial review[,] . . . and dangerous in 
fomenting disrespect for our highest law.”87 Virginia’s own Attorney 
General thought his state’s interposition resolution was “legally 
meaningless.”88 A University of Texas law professor offered a 
practical rejection of the nullification doctrine, saying that 
“nullification or interposition just will not work” because federal 
officials had “the will and the raw power to enforce any judgment of 
a federal court.”89 These attorneys and scholars were proven correct 
in their criticism of the nullification doctrine as several court 
decisions (discussed below) patently rejected the South’s attempt to 
nullify Brown and destroyed any hope for the nullification doctrine’s 
general acceptance. 
a. The Supreme Court’s rejection of nullification. In Cooper v. 
Aaron, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected any notion 
that nullification is, or ever was, within a state’s power.90 In Cooper, 
an Arkansas school board filed a petition in district court seeking to 
postpone its desegregation program.91 The school board claimed 
that “the maintenance of a sound educational program . . . would be 
impossible” at Central High School in Little Rock because of the 
extreme public hostility against desegregation that was allegedly 
 
 86.   See Hagley, supra note 29, at 193 n.184 (quoting TUSHNET, supra note 85, at 
240). Powell also wrote that if he were a federal judge, an attorney’s citation to interposition 
or nullification resolutions would persuade him to rule the other way. TUSHNET, supra note 
85, at 240–41. 
 87.   Ross, supra note 59, at 495–96 (quoting Recent Attacks Upon the Supreme Court: A 
Statement by Members of the Bar, 42 A.B.A. J. 1128, 1128–29 (1956)). 
 88.   TUSHNET, supra note 85, at 241. 
 89.   Ross, supra note 59, at 495 (citing George W. Stumberg, The School Segregation 
Cases: Supporting the Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A. J. 318, 319–20 (1956)). The 
federal government was forced to use this “raw power” to enforce desegregation because state 
officials in the South refused to end their opposition to Brown. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1, 8–12 (1958) (describing the violent circumstances surrounding desegregation in Little 
Rock, Arkansas that required federal troops to keep the peace at Central High School for 
several months). 
 90.   Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4, 18. 
 91.   Id. at 12. 
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engendered by Arkansas’s Governor and legislature.92 In an attempt 
to nullify the decision, Arkansas’s legislature amended the state 
constitution to render the Brown case unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, the Governor prevented African-American students 
from entering the school for a three-week period, at which time the 
federal government was forced to intervene with federal troops.93 
The Court refused to grant the school board’s petition for 
postponement despite this hostile environment—finding that the 
nine African-Americans’ constitutional rights could not be sacrificed 
simply because of violence or disorder.94 However, the Court did not 
stop there; it went on to categorically reject the nullification doctrine 
and dismiss Arkansas’s attempt to nullify the Brown decision.95 
Rejecting the nullification doctrine was not a difficult exercise of 
judicial decision making for the Court; the Court stated that to 
dismiss the doctrine, “It is necessary only to recall some basic 
constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine.”96 The Court 
cited the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and referred to 
Marbury v. Madison97 for the principle that “the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,” a principle 
that is a “permanent and indispensible” component of our 
constitutional system.98 The Court spoke in no uncertain terms in 
rejecting nullification, stating that the doctrine would render the 
Constitution “a solemn mockery”99 and reasoning that if a governor 
could nullify a federal court order, “the fiat of a state Governor, and 
not the Constitution . . . would be the supreme law of the land.”100 
The Court concluded that the principles announced in Brown, “and 
 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id. at 8–9, 11–12. 
 94.   Id. at 15–17 (“[T]he Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive 
schemes for segregation.”). 
 95.   Id. at 17–18. 
 96.   Id. at 17. 
 97.   5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 98.   Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 99.   Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809)). 
Chief Justice Marshall’s full statement on the issue of nullification reads, “If the legislatures of 
the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and 
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn 
mockery.” Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 115, 136. 
 100.   Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397–98 
(1932)). 
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the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of 
the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the 
freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us.”101 
Nullification, therefore, was unanimously and expressly rejected by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
b. The nullification doctrine was again rejected. In Bush v. Orleans 
Parish School Board, three federal district court judges reiterated that 
the nullification doctrine has no legal efficacy in the U.S. 
constitutional system.102 The Bush case involved several plaintiffs who 
sought to enjoin measures passed by the Louisiana legislature 
opposing the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. One such law attempted to nullify Brown, announcing 
that the decision was “null, void and of no effect as to the State of 
Louisiana.”103 The three-judge panel granted the plaintiffs’ 
injunctions and held that Louisiana’s attempt to nullify the Brown 
decision was unconstitutional.104 
Like the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron, the Bush court 
outlined the absolute necessity that the U.S. Supreme Court be 
respected as the final tribunal for constitutional adjudication. The 
district court cited several of Madison’s contributions to The 
Federalist, emphasizing that a final constitutional tribunal “is clearly 
essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the 
compact.”105 Additionally, the three-judge panel labeled Louisiana’s 
interposition resolution as “a preposterous perversion of Article V of 
the Constitution” because the resolution improperly asserted that 
the Supreme Court’s Brown decision would cease to be law until the 
people could ratify a constitutional amendment—an idea completely 
foreign to the Article V amendment process.106 The district court 
ended its complete rejection of the nullification and interposition 
doctrines by stating, “The conclusion is clear that interposition is not 
a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of 
 
 101.   Id. at 19–20. 
 102.   Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La. 1960), aff’d per 
curiam, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). 
 103.   Id. at 922. 
 104.   Id. at 926. 
 105.   Id. at 924–25 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 214 (James Madison) (E. H. 
Scott ed., 1898)). 
 106.   Id. at 926. 
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constitutional authority.”107 In a one paragraph per curiam opinion, 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in 
Bush; the Court cited to its earlier rejection of the nullification and 
interposition doctrines in Cooper v. Aaron and reiterated that these 
doctrines are “without substance.”108 With the Cooper and Bush 
decisions, the federal judiciary has thoroughly dismantled any hope 
that the nullification doctrine has constitutional validity. 
The repeated rejection of the nullification and interposition 
doctrines—from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, to John 
Calhoun’s Nullification Crisis, and finally to Massive Resistance in 
the South—demonstrates that states retain no constitutional power 
to nullify federal law. Next this Comment will discuss how the 
current state opposition to federal health care reform constitutes an 
attempt to nullify such legislation and is therefore an 
unconstitutional exercise of state power. 
4. Measures taken by states opposing federal health reform are 
unconstitutional attempts to nullify federal law 
Current state opposition to federal health care reform constitutes 
an unconstitutional attempt by states to nullify or invalidate federal 
law. This Section examines a specific provision taken in opposition to 
federal health care reform and demonstrates that such measures are 
unconstitutional attempts to nullify or invalidate federal law.  
The bill passed by the Utah State Legislature (House Bill 67) is 
an example of an attempt to invalidate part of the federal health care 
legislation and is representative of similar bills being passed or 
proposed in other states.109 Utah House Bill 67, entitled “Freedom 
from Federal Health Reform Efforts,” declares that “the federal 
government proposals for health systems reform infringe on state 
powers” and that federal health care reform “infringe[s] on the 
 
 107.   Id. The district court also stated, “However solemn or spirited, interposition 
resolutions have no legal efficacy.” Id. 
 108.   Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 364 U.S. 500, 500–01 (1960) (per curiam) (citing 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). 
 109.   See H.B. 67, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/ 
hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5 (2010)); see also 
Health Backlash in the States, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2010, at A12 (explaining how Utah’s bill is 
similar to proposed bills in many other states). 
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rights of citizens of this state to provide for their own health care.”110 
The Utah bill goes on to assert that “[a] department or agency of 
the state may not implement any part of federal health care reform 
passed by the United States Congress . . . unless . . . the Legislature 
pass[es] legislation specifically authorizing the state’s compliance 
with, or participation in, federal health care reform.”111 
Even though Utah House Bill 67 does not use terms of art like 
“nullify” or “interpose”—terms used in past nullification 
movements—the language quoted above demonstrates that Utah’s 
law opposing federal health care reform constitutes an 
unconstitutional attempt to invalidate federal law. Like the 
previously discussed nullification ordinance passed by South Carolina 
in 1832, which declared federal tariff laws inapplicable inside the 
state of South Carolina,112 Utah House Bill 67 purports to make 
federal health care reform inapplicable within the state of Utah 
unless the Utah state legislature explicitly approves participation in 
such federal law—thereby unconstitutionally attempting to invalidate 
federal health care reform as it would apply to Utah citizens. 
Additionally, just as southern state legislatures improperly passed 
resolutions asserting that the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
unconstitutionally infringed upon state powers over education,113 
Utah House Bill 67 suggests that federal health care reform infringes 
upon state powers to administer health care, powers the states claim 
are retained under the Tenth Amendment.114 This assertion that 
federal health care reform “infringe[s] on state powers”115 is a direct 
declaration that such reform is unconstitutional. Utah’s declaration 
that federal health care reform is unconstitutional is similar to the 
declarations of unconstitutionality found in the Kentucky and 
 
 110.  H.B. 67, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/ 
hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63M-1-2505.5 (1)(d)(i), (iv) 
(2010)). 
 111.   Id. § 1(2) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5 (2)(a), (b) (2010)). 
 112.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 113.   See supra Part II.A.3. 
 114.   H.B. 67, Gen. Sess., § 1(1)(d) (Utah 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~ 
2010/bills/hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5 (1)(d)(i) 
(2010)); see also Thalman, supra note 5 (describing how some leading Utah Republicans have 
recently asserted their belief that federal health care reform is unconstitutional). 
 115.   H.B. 67, Gen. Sess., § 1(1)(d) (Utah 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~ 
2010/bills/hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5 (1)(d)(i) 
(2010)). 
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Virginia Resolutions, the South Carolina ordinance passed during 
the Nullification Crisis, and the resolutions passed by southern 
legislatures to nullify Brown—all of which were constitutionally 
invalid efforts by states to oppose federal law. Consequently, “[i]f 
taken seriously,” Utah’s attempt to invalidate federal health care 
reform within its borders constitutes “illegal defiance of 
constitutional authority.”116  
In fact, the Utah Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel (the Utah legislature’s in-house legal counsel) directly 
questions Utah House Bill 67’s constitutionality, stating that the bill 
“might violate the Supremacy Clause,” that Congress likely has 
power under both the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and 
Spending Clause to enact federal health care reform, and pointing 
out that states cannot challenge federal law under the Tenth 
Amendment because “the Supreme Court has interpreted the 10th 
Amendment as a ‘truism.’”117 The Office of Legislative Research and 
General Counsel further explains that it is “unlikely” that the 
Supreme Court “would invalidate an exercise of [federal] commerce 
power as violative of the 10th Amendment.”118 The Office also 
concludes that Utah House Bill 67 likely violates the separation-of-
powers provisions of Utah’s own constitution, which prohibit one 
branch of state government from interfering with the powers of 
another branch of state government.119 Utah’s bill violates separation 
of powers because it would prohibit the executive branch of the state 
from implementing any provision of federal health care reform 
without state legislative approval.120 Therefore, the Utah 
Legislature’s own legal counsel repeatedly questions the validity and 
constitutionality of Utah House Bill 67. 
State attempts to nullify federal law within their borders have 
been repeatedly rejected throughout U.S. history as unconstitutional 
exercises of state power. Current attempts by as many as thirty-six 
 
 116.   See supra Part II.B.3.b.; Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 
(E.D. La. 1960). 
 117.   H.B. 67, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010) (Legis. Rev. Note), available at 
http://le.utah.gov/ ~2010/bills/hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf. 
 118.   Id. 
 119.   Id.; UTAH CONST. art. V. 
 120.   H.B. 67, Gen. Sess., at 4–5 (Utah 2010) (Legis. Rev. Note), available at 
http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint/hb0067s01.pdf (“The separation of powers doctrine 
prohibits one department of government from interfering with, encroaching upon, or 
exercising the powers of either of the other branches of state government.”). 
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states to nullify federal health care reform are no different—these 
efforts are clear violations of the Constitution. 
III. NULLIFICATION AS A POLITICAL CHECK AGAINST FEDERAL 
POWER 
If state movements to nullify federal law have been repeatedly 
rejected throughout U.S. history, why do states continue their 
attempts to invalidate federal law? Although the nullification 
doctrine has no constitutional foundation, state attempts to nullify 
federal law function as a powerful political check on the national 
legislative process. Nullification movements may communicate 
widespread public opposition to the federal law in question, may 
foreshadow a costly fight for the federal government in 
implementing the federal law, and may help maintain an issue’s 
political salience for the long-term—enabling the opposition to 
benefit politically from a seemingly unpopular federal law. 
“Salience” is the public prominence of a political issue and is the 
product of interaction between voters and interest groups, media, 
political parties, and activists.121 Political issues are typically linked to 
particular events (e.g., the passage of a controversial law) that cause 
the issue to break through into the public’s consciousness.122 
However, once political issues attain such public prominence, they 
begin to lose their salience as these events “fade in public 
memory.”123 When the political and economic stakes are high, 
interest groups and politicians seek to maintain an issue’s salience 
long enough to capitalize from the political issue in the voting 
booth.124 
This Part will first outline the political capital gained by those 
involved in past nullification movements. The Part will then discuss 
the potential ways in which current state opposition to federal health 
 
 121.   Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal 
Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 122 
(2005); see also Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, On the Evolution of Political Issues, 
in AGENDA FORMATION 151, 151–53 (William H. Riker ed., 1993). 
 122.   See Carmines & Stimson, supra note 121, at 157; see also David A. Super, From 
Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1122 n.86 (2010). 
 123.   Carmines & Stimson, supra note 121, at 157; see also Super, supra note 122, at 
1122 n.86. 
 124.   See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 644; see also Super, supra note 122, at 1122. 
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care reform maintains the issue’s salience leading up to the 2010 
election and applies political pressure to Democratic congressional 
leaders and the Obama Administration.125 
A. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions Directly Impacted the  
Election of 1800 
Although the principles espoused in the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions were generally rejected by other states, opposition to the 
Alien and Sedition Acts became a major rallying cry against Federalist 
candidates in the election of 1800.126 This widespread opposition to 
the Alien and Sedition Acts “may be said to be the first party 
platform in the history of American parties,” and “resulted directly in 
displacing the Federalists from power and bringing the Jeffersonian 
Republicans into the control of the Government.”127 In his 
presidential inauguration speech, Jefferson stated that the first step 
toward national harmony “would be the termination of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts.”128 Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican 
cohorts used the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to publicize 
their dissatisfaction with and opposition to the controlling party in 
Washington—thereby maintaining the political salience of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts up to and throughout the election of 1800.129 This 
public opposition eventually translated to a change in political 
leadership and a constitutional repeal of the very laws Virginia and 
Kentucky unconstitutionally attempted to nullify.130 
 
 125.   In describing the political value to be gained from attempts by states to nullify 
federal law, this Comment by no means endorses such unconstitutional movements. The 
Comment merely discusses the potential political value of such conduct and suggests reasons 
why states continue to engage in nullification of federal law despite the doctrine’s clear 
unconstitutionality. 
 126.   JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 182; see also EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT 
CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, AMERICA’S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN 96 (2007). 
 127.   JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 182; see also Alan Taylor, The Alien and Sedition Acts, 
in THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY 63 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 
2004) (“[T]he Alien and Sedition Acts proved so unpopular that they contributed to the 
Federalists’ crushing defeat in the pivotal national election of 1800.”). 
 128.   JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 
205 (2004). 
 129.   See supra Part II.A.1. 
 130.   JOHNSTON, supra note 19, at 197 (“[Madison’s and Jefferson’s] descendants have 
found that the small percentage of the voting population, which can, by a change of vote 
overturn the dominant party in Congress, is a better guarantee against Congressional 
usurpation than all the resolutions of our history.”). 
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B. Calhoun’s Nullification Crisis Led to Political Compromise with the 
Federal Government 
South Carolina’s strong opposition (expressed through 
nullification) to federal tariffs on southern products in 1832 
eventually compelled the federal government to adopt a compromise 
tariff.131 The dire threat of secession asserted by South Carolina and 
Calhoun forced the federal government to assess whether the tariff 
laws were worth internal conflict.132 Notably, Congress could have 
constitutionally approved the Force Bill allowing President Jackson 
to compel compliance with federal law by military force; it is within 
the federal government’s power to see that its laws are faithfully 
executed and there is no question South Carolina was acting 
unconstitutionally.133 However, South Carolina’s nullification 
resolution required members of Congress to ask themselves a 
political question—was compromise a better or easier solution to the 
crisis than compelling South Carolina’s compliance by military force?  
Since many feared the use of force could lead to more 
widespread conflict and dissent, Congress made the policy decision 
that despite South Carolina’s unconstitutional actions of nullification 
and threatened secession, a compromise tariff was the better political 
choice at that time.134 The Nullification Crisis suggests that 
nullification movements, despite their unconstitutionality, force the 
federal government to make difficult policy decisions that may 
weaken the political strength of those in power. Compromise by the 
federal government in the face of state opposition validates such 
opposition because it communicates to states that they may have 
something to gain in opposing (even unlawfully) federal law. 
C. Massive Resistance to the Brown Decision Made Implementation of 
Federal Law Much More Difficult for the Federal Government 
Attempts by southern states to thwart the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown made implementing school desegregation plans 
 
 131.   ELLIS, supra note 52, at 172–77 (describing the federal government’s precarious 
position and the events that led to compromise). 
 132.   Id. at 173. 
 133.   Id. at 158–60. 
 134.   Id. at 170–77 (explaining the difficult political decisions Congress was forced to 
make in response to South Carolina’s nullification declaration). 
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much more difficult for the federal government.135 In an effort to 
evade Brown’s implementation, southern legislatures, over a three-
year period, passed 450 laws aimed at delaying desegregation.136 
These actions by southern states called Washington’s bluff, and the 
federal government was once again faced with a difficult political 
choice—compromise with the South by tempering desegregation 
requirements despite the states’ unconstitutional attempts to thwart 
Brown, or compel compliance with the Brown decision by force.  
Unlike Congress’s decision to avoid forcible compliance in 
response to the Nullification Crisis, the federal government had “the 
will and the raw power” to compel the desegregation process.137 
However, forcing states to comply with Brown was not an easy task 
for the federal government. On multiple occasions, the federal 
government was required to dispatch federal troops or federalize 
National Guard units in order to stop states from avoiding 
desegregation.138 Additionally, since the 1950s, federal district courts 
have been required to closely supervise the desegregation of school 
districts throughout the country—in 2001, over four-hundred 
school districts remained under court supervision.139 Massive 
Resistance to desegregation demonstrates that if the federal 
government decides to compel states to abide by federal law, state 
opposition requires the federal government to actively mandate 
detailed state-by-state compliance, by force if necessary. Forcing such 
compliance may prove costly and may take decades to accomplish. 
 
 135.   See Hagley, supra note 29, at 195. Again, this Comment in no way argues that 
opposing desegregation was a positive or valuable campaign—on the contrary, this Comment 
argues that such action was facially unconstitutional. However, state opposition to the Brown 
decision did delay desegregation by forcing the federal government to compel state compliance 
with Brown. States today may look back to the Massive Resistance movement and recognize 
the potential political gains for states and possible high costs for the federal government when 
states oppose federal law. 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Ross, supra note 59, at 495–96 (citing George W. Stumberg, The School Segregation 
Cases: Supporting the Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A. J. 318, 319–20 (1956)). 
 138.   See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1958) (describing actions taken by 
state leaders to thwart desegregation efforts at Central High School in Little Rock and the 
subsequent circumstances surrounding the placement of federal troops at the school to compel 
compliance with desegregation); CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES 
MEREDITH AND THE INTEGRATION OF OLE MISS 340–41 (2009) (explaining how President 
Kennedy federalized Mississippi’s National Guard, and mobilized both the army and U.S. 
marshals to protect James Meredith as he attended the University of Mississippi). 
 139.   Monika L. Moore, Unclear Standards Create an Unclear Future: Developing a Better 
Definition of Unitary Statute, 112 YALE L.J. 311, 311 (2002). 
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D. State Attempts to Nullify the Real ID Act of 2005 Have 
Contributed to the Act’s Possible Repeal 
State opposition to the Real ID Act is part of a widespread effort 
that may lead to the Act’s repeal in Congress. The Real ID Act, 
passed in response to recommendations made by the 9/11 
Commission, requires states to follow heightened standards and 
procedures in the issuance of state driver’s licenses and will create a 
national identification system.140 Opponents to Real ID, including a 
number of states, argue that the Act is unconstitutional because it 
violates a person’s inherent right of privacy in amassing a federal 
identification database.141 Opponents to the Act also assert that Real 
ID violates the Tenth Amendment by legislating in an area (state 
identification) reserved to the states.142 Since 2005, as many as 
twenty states have passed measures which prohibit their state 
agencies from complying with Real ID—thereby attempting to 
invalidate the Act within their borders.143 Several more states are in 
the process of passing similar legislation opposing the Act.144 
Although these attempts to nullify Real ID are unconstitutional and 
without legal foundation, the state opposition movement against 
Real ID contributes to the Act’s continued political salience by 
 
 140.   Christopher Wolf, Recent Federal Developments in Privacy and Information Security, 
969 PLI/PAT 449, 472–74 (2009) (discussing recent developments with the Real ID Act). 
 141.   Bob Barr, Real ID Act a Real Intrusion on Rights, Privacy, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
Feb. 6, 2008, at A23 (arguing that the Real ID Act violates the right of privacy and 
commending the state of Georgia for “standing against this assault on states’ rights and the Bill 
of Rights”). 
 142.   Anthony D. Romero, Repeal Real ID, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2007, at A12 (“Real 
ID is an unfunded mandate that violates the Constitution’s 10th Amendment on state powers, 
destroys states’ dual sovereignty and consolidates every American’s private information, leaving 
all of us far more vulnerable to identity thieves.”). 
 143.   See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Maine Rejects Real ID Act, CNET NEWS, Jan. 25, 
2007, http://news.cnet.com/2100-7348_3-6153532.html (Maine); Dena Potter, Real ID 
Mandate Resisted in Virginia, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 2009/jan/03/some-legislators-oppose-real-id-act-
mandate (Virginia); Governor Signs Bill Defying U.S. ID Law, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 
2007, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/article_ 
1855fed8-6e4c-5be1-82de-7ffe2f953c0c.html (Montana). Notably, despite invalidating Real 
ID within its borders, Montana claims it has not “nullified” the Real ID Act, but has only 
“opposed” the Act. See id. However, it is difficult to determine how declaring a federal law 
unconstitutional and invalidating such a law within the state’s borders is not a form of 
nullification even though Montana wants to avoid using such language. 
 144.   Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States, ACLU, http://www.realnight 
mare.org/news/105/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
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keeping the issue in the public’s consciousness while adding to a 
widespread call for the Act’s lawful repeal in Congress.145 
State opposition to Real ID, like previous nullification 
movements, presents the federal government with several difficult 
political choices. The government can risk political backlash and 
somehow force state compliance with the Act, adjust the Act’s 
requirements in a way that would satisfy state concerns, or even 
repeal the Act completely. Thus, the unconstitutionality of 
nullification movements does not end the inquiry because such 
movements may place a great deal of political pressure upon the 
federal government to change or repeal an unpopular law. 
E. The Potential Political Value of State Opposition to Federal Health 
Care Reform 
Regardless of the nullification doctrine’s unconstitutionality, 
state opposition to the health care overhaul package keeps the issue 
in the general public’s consciousness, maintains the issue’s political 
salience, and thereby enables Republicans to capitalize on such 
opposition in the November 2010 election. State opposition to the 
health care overhaul also conveys (at least the appearance of) 
widespread public disapproval of such reform—forcing congressional 
Democrats to defend passing such legislation despite strong public 
opposition against it. State opposition also warns the federal 
government that implementation of federal health care reform on a 
state level will be resisted by a majority of states and may require the 
federal government to actively compel detailed state-by-state 
compliance. 
1. State opposition to health care reform applies political pressure to 
leaders in Washington 
As states join together in their opposition to federal health care 
legislation, they place a great deal of political pressure on federal 
leaders who supported reform. Similar to the way state opposition to 
 
 145.   Anne Broache, Senators Skeptical of Real ID Act Rules, CNET NEWS,                 
Mar. 26, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Senators-skeptical-of-Real-ID-Act-rules/2100-
1028_361705 83.html (“Leaders of a U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs panel joined a chorus of outsiders, including many state government officials, who have 
questioned the costs and privacy implications of the congressionally mandated shift to 
identification cards that must adhere to a bevy of national standards.”); see also Andrea Fuller, 
Effort to Replace Federal Driver’s License Mandate Gains, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A20. 
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the Alien and Sedition Acts became a powerful political platform in 
the election of 1800 that propelled the opposition party into power, 
widespread state hostility to federal health care reform could 
contribute to (and arguably already has contributed to) Republican 
gains at the voting booth.146 Even before Congress passed the health 
care reform bill, one observer noted, “[C]onservative commentators 
are already calling ‘Obamacare’—in whatever form it takes—a loss 
for the Democrats.”147 Republicans claim the bill was passed in the 
face of strong public opposition, a sign that congressional Democrats 
and the Obama Administration ignored the will of the people.148 
State nullification movements simply bolster Republican claims that 
the current leadership in Washington is not listening to the people—
nullification movements are concrete examples of public disapproval. 
Democrats currently up for reelection will especially feel the political 
heat of federal health care reform because they will be forced to 
explain why they voted for the bill despite thirty-six states (possibly 
including their own state) undertaking measures to oppose it.149 
 
 146.   See Editorial, The Massachusetts Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A38 
(suggesting that fierce public opposition by Republicans against health care reform may have 
contributed to Scott Brown’s unexpected victory in the Massachusetts Senate race); see also 
Patrick H. Caddell & Douglas E. Schoen, If Democrats Ignore Health-Care Polls, Midterms 
Will Be Costly, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17 (“For Democrats to begin turning around 
their political fortunes there has to be a frank acknowledgment that the comprehensive health-
care initiative is a failure, regardless of whether it passes. . . . Unless the Democrats 
fundamentally change their approach, they will produce not just a march of folly but also run 
the risk of unmitigated disaster in November.”). In making this comparison between the Alien 
and Sedition Acts and the current federal health care legislation, the author in no way is 
suggesting that the two laws are similar in their constitutionality or lack thereof. As discussed 
above, most scholars argue that the health care reform legislation is constitutional, see supra 
notes 11–12 and accompanying text, while few would disagree that the Sedition Act violated 
the First Amendment. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“Although 
the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day 
in the court of history.”). 
 147.   Stephanie Condon, Health Care Reform: No Good Options for Dems?, CBS NEWS, 
Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6130085-503544.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
 148.   This claim was made by those opposing federal health care reform and will continue 
to be made throughout the November 2010 election. See, e.g., Kristen Wyatt, Vulnerable 
Democrats Are Tiptoeing on Health Care, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 8, 2010; Pamela Rogowicz, 
Letter to the Editor, Obama Is Not Listening to the People, POCONO REC., Feb. 21, 2010, 
available at http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100221/NEWS 
04/2210307/-1/news0401. 
 149.   Michael Riley, Markey, DeGette in Middle of Health Care Reform Quagmire, 
DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 2010, at A1 (describing how House Democrat Betsy Markey from 
Colorado “is a vulnerable Democrat” who is currently “squeezed between the unpleasant 
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2. State opposition to health care reform maintains the issue’s long-term 
political salience 
State opposition to federal health care reform, whether through 
nullification movements or through lawsuits challenging the health 
care overhaul’s constitutionality,150 also contributes to maintaining 
health care reform’s long-term political salience. As discussed above, 
important political issues lose their political salience as the events 
giving rise to the issue fade from the public’s memory.151 
Consequently, those who have something to gain (e.g., political 
capital) by keeping the issue in the public’s consciousness will engage 
in efforts to maintain an issue’s salience long enough to capitalize in 
the voting booth.  
State opposition to federal health care reform garners media 
coverage, generates political discussion and literature, and otherwise 
keeps the issue in the public eye—thereby playing an important role 
in health care reform’s continued salience in the November 2010 
election and possibly in elections to come. As long as opposing 
health care reform is politically salient, interest groups will continue 
spending money supporting such opposition,152 and the Republicans 
will continue reminding voters that the fight against health care 
reform is not yet lost. In other words, the longer the issue remains 
politically salient, the longer Republicans can seek to capitalize on 
the negativity surrounding health care reform.153 
 
prospect of alienating her base Democratic voters or the independents she’ll need in a tough 
2010 fight”); see also Dick Polman, If Democrats Stumble on Health Care, Republicans Win, 
OLYMPIAN, Mar. 11, 2010 (“[A]ccording to polls, swing-voting independents generally 
oppose the sweep and price tag of Obama’s proposed overhaul.”); Wyatt, supra note 148 
(“Tough votes for Obama’s health care plan have further complicated the re-election prospects 
of dozens of already vulnerable freshman and second-term Democrats.”). 
 150.   See Fletcher, supra note 12 (explaining that eighteen states have filed a lawsuit in 
Florida challenging the constitutionality of the federal health care reform package). 
 151.   See supra text accompanying notes 121–24. 
 152.   Kirkpatrick, supra note 5, at A1 (discussing the large campaign contributions made 
by the health care lobby to Republican sponsors of state nullification bills). The health care 
lobby’s large donations to state lawmakers, “[are] just one example of how insurance 
companies, hospitals and other health care interests have been positioning themselves in 
statehouses around the country to influence the outcome of the proposed health care 
overhaul.” Id. 
 153.   See Christine Todd Whitman et al., Can the Republicans Win in November with a 
Negative Strategy?, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2010, at A11 (compiling opinions from political 
experts on both sides of the aisle concerning whether the Republican Party would win in the 
November 2010 election with a negative strategy). However, Republicans must continue to 
pay close attention to public sentiment regarding the health care overhaul package because, as 
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3. State opposition to health care reform may contribute to the law being 
repealed 
Widespread state opposition to federal health care reform may 
even eventually contribute to the reform’s repeal in Congress. Just as 
widespread state and national opposition to the Real ID Act has 
many in Congress calling for the Act’s repeal,154 the current 
opposition to federal health care reform, whether by states 
attempting to nullify such reform or by Republican congressional 
leaders campaigning against it, will likely lead to future Republican 
attempts to repeal federal health care reform.155 Conservative 
politicians and pundits are already claiming that, since Democrats 
used the reconciliation process in passing amendments to the health 
care reform bill, Republicans will use the same process to repeal the 
health care overhaul when they eventually reclaim the congressional 
majority.156 As states continue their efforts in opposing the federal 
health care overhaul, calls for the law’s repeal will only increase 
because Republicans will point to such widespread state opposition 
as an indication that the nation wants the bill repealed. As long as 
there is political capital to be gained by promising the law’s repeal, 
Republicans will continue making such promises—especially in an 
election year. 
 
Christine Todd Whitman, Chair of the Republican Leadership Council points out, “if voters 
start to see benefits or even a lack of disaster from the recently passed [health care] legislation, 
Republicans could be in jeopardy over our doomsday predictions.” Id. 
 154.   See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 155.   See Stephanie Condon, Health Care Repeal Effort Splits Conservative, Moderate 
Republicans, CBS NEWS, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-
20002023-503544.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (“Right-wing members of the Republican 
party continue to push for a full repeal of the Democrats’ new package of health care reforms, 
even as GOP leaders have blunted their message to one of ‘repeal and replace.’”). 
 156.   See, e.g., Karl Rove, The Trouble with ‘Reconciliation,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010, 
at A15. Congress also used the reconciliation process to pass amendments to the health care 
bill, and to take private banks out of the federal student loan process. Christi Parsons & Janet 
Hook, Obama Signs Reconciliation Bill with Major Student Loan Change, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
31, 2010, at A8. Since Obama could veto a Republican repeal of federal health care reform, 
“Republicans probably couldn’t mount a real threat unless they won the White House in 
2012.” Ronald Brownstein, GOP Faces Choice If Health Bill Passes, NAT’L J. MAG., Nov. 14, 
2009, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/ nj_20091114_2045.php; 
see also Patricia Zengerle, Obama Dares Republicans to Seek Healthcare Repeal, REUTERS, Mar. 
25, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/idUSTRE62N61Y20100325. 
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4. State opposition to health care reform may require the long and 
expensive process of compelling state-by-state compliance 
Compelling state compliance with federal health care reform may 
also prove economically burdensome for the federal government. As 
discussed above, compelling desegregation in the 1950s and 1960s 
was extremely costly for the federal government, though obviously 
worth the cost. Washington was required to dispatch hundreds of 
federal law enforcement officers to compel short-term compliance,157 
and the federal judiciary is still—over fifty years later—involved in 
assuring long-term desegregation compliance in many states.158 
In light of widespread state opposition to federal health care 
reform, compelling compliance with the reform package is also likely 
to place great costs on the federal government. The federal 
government may be forced to engage in the very expensive process 
of challenging (or responding to challenges from) state opposition 
measures in courts throughout the country.159 This litigation may 
take years to resolve, and may delay the application of federal health 
care reform. Additionally, if state agencies refuse to implement 
portions of federal health care reform (as state nullification laws 
currently require), federal agencies would either be required to 
implement federal health care reform themselves, or the federal 
government would be required to somehow forcibly compel state 
agencies to comply with implementation mandates. 
Therefore, despite nullification’s clear unconstitutionality, 
attempts by states to nullify federal law may place tremendous 
political pressure on the federal government. Nullification 
movements require the federal government to make difficult political 
choices that may not have a clear solution or outcome. As long as 
there is political capital to be gained by such action, states will likely 
continue their attempts to nullify federal legislation. 
 
 157.   See supra Part III.C. 
 158.   ALFRED A. LINDSETH, Legal Issues Related to School Funding/Desegregation, in 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 41–43 (Christine H. Rossell et al. eds., 
2002). 
 159.   As discussed above, the federal government is already engaged in several lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of health care reform. See Fletcher, supra note 12. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In response to a strong push toward federal health care reform in 
Washington, states across the country have taken measures to oppose 
such legislation. This opposition effort by states against health care 
reform constitutes state nullification of federal law. These state 
nullification measures generally declare that federal health care 
reform is unconstitutional and claim to prevent any such reform 
from applying within the borders of their respective states. However, 
the nullification doctrine is an unconstitutional exercise of state 
power and has been repeatedly rejected throughout U.S. history. 
States have no authority to declare federal laws unconstitutional and 
cannot invalidate federal laws that would otherwise apply within their 
borders.  
Despite the unconstitutional nature of the nullification doctrine, 
state attempts to nullify federal health care reform may serve a 
political purpose. Such opposition maintains the issue’s political 
salience, conveys at least the appearance of widespread political 
opposition to federal health care reform, and makes the 
implementation of such reform more difficult for the federal 
government. Therefore, state nullification measures, from the 
opposition’s point of view, may be useful political tools in opposing 
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